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The Reproducibility of Evolving Social
Science Evidence and How It Shapes Equal
Protection Jurisprudence
by

PENNEY

P. AzIzi

Background
In Korematsu v. United States,' the United States Supreme Court held
that strict scrutiny would apply to cases regarding statutes that create
2
classifications based on race. This means that the burden of proof is on
the government to show that the challenged statute, law, or classification is
3
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Furthermore, legal
scholars attribute the influx in the application of sociological data into the
federal courts' decisions to the "legal realist movement and its attempt to
focus awareness

on social context.'

As the

social sciences

grew,

practitioners, including leaders of socio-legal studies, began looking at the
Psychologist, Hugo
relationship between social sciences and law.
Mtinsterberg, advanced the idea that social sciences were necessary for the
study of law. 6 Karl Llewellyn and Benjamin Cardozo promoted the
7
development of the study of law based on social science evidence.

*

Juris Doctor Candidate 2017, University of California, Hastings College of the Law;

1. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (The Supreme Court's analysis in
Korematsu provides a backdrop for the standards of review that the Court considers appropriate
in addressing Fourteenth Amendment violations.).
2. Id. at 216 ("It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the
civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such
restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid
scrutiny."); see also DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LABORATORY OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT'S
200-YEAR STRUGGLE TO INTEGRATE SCIENCE AND THE LAW 255 (2004).

3. Geoffrey R. Stone et al., Constitutional Law 520-21 (7th ed. 2013).
4. Henry F. Fradella, A Content Analysis of Federal Judicial Views of the Social Science
"Researcher'sBlack Arts," 35 RUTGERS L.J. 103, 106 (2003).
5.
6.
7.

Id
Id.
Id.
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Today, the majority of legislatures do not classify people in a manner
that overtly disadvantages a particular population based on race within
statutes. However, even though some laws appear facially neutral, they
may affect minority populations in disparate and detrimental ways. 9 For
example, a law that places the death penalty in the discretion of the jury
may, on its face, impact the population equally, only until there is proof
that juries use such discretion, whether intentionally or subconsciously, to
target certain races.10 Disparate impact alone, however, is insufficient to
require the Court to apply strict scrutiny." The circumstances in which the
law was imposed must be considered when showing that the underlying
purpose was racially discriminatory, violating the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause.12
Furthermore, the role of social sciences in Equal Protection
jurisprudence has long been a controversial topic. In 1896, the Court heard
Plessy v. Ferguson, a case questioning the validity of a Louisiana statute
authorizing "equal but separate" accommodations to blacks and whites.13
The Court relied on notions of legal formalism and held that the statute was
not unreasonable because it was based on social custom.14 The Court noted

that the argument "separate facilities are unequal" is a construction placed
on the statute by the "colored race." 5 More specifically, the Court noted
that the plaintiffs argument was based on the false notion that the
"enforced separation" of races "stamps the colored race with a badge of
inferiority."I 6 The Court went further in stating that "[i]f this be so, it is not
by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race
chooses to put that construction upon it.""
Justice Harlan wrote a
memorable dissent, stating that "[o]ur Constitution is color-blind, and
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens," thus advancing the
belief that discriminatory laws should not be upheld.' 8

8.

FAIGMAN, supra note 2.

9.
10.

Id.

11.

FAIGMAN, supra note 2.

12.
13.
14.

Id.

See discussion of McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) below.

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540 (1896).
Id. at 550-51.

15. Id. at 551.
16. Id.
17. Id
18. Id at 559; see generally Molly Townes O'Brien, Justice John Marshall Harlan as
Prophet: The Plessy Dissenter's Color-Blind Constitution, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 753
(1998).
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More than fifty years after Plessy, the Supreme Court based a
monumental decision partly on social science evidence appearing in the
famous Footnote 11 of Brown v. Board of Education, written by Justice
Warren.1 9 The Court's holding in Brown echoed a more progressive view
that racial segregation in schools constitutes a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.2 0
Brown's Footnote 11 was highly debated by legal scholars who both
applauded and criticized the Court for its application of social science
evidence. 2' For some, the Court's citation ushered in a glimmering
possibility that a relationship was beginning to develop between social
sciences and the law, especially where public laws were implicated.2 2
However, the development of this relationship was short-lived, and critics
of this potential bond pointed to Justice Warren's remark that the footnote
"was only a note, after all." 23 These scholars believed that Footnote 11 was
just a way for the Court to arrive at a holding it was inevitably going to
24
arrive at. The Brown footnote placed both courts and judges in a position
where they were to interpret information about topics unfamiliar to them,
ultimately revealing the Court's limitations in understanding and
The Court in Brown confronted the
interpreting expert evidence. 25
Fourteenth Amendment in conjunction with "presenting the question of
whether 'segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of
race ... deprive[s] the children of the minority group of equal educational
opportunities."' 26 Constitutional law scholar, David Faigman, points out
that
[o]f the five traditional principles of constitutional
adjudication, none squarely supports the decision [in
Brown,] and several indicate a contrary result. The text of
the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment is, at best, ambiguous on
the matter, and the Brown result appears contrary to the
framers' original intent. 27
19. Fradella, supra note 4, at 106; Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.1 1(1954).
20. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95.
21. Rachel F. Moran, What Counts as Knowledge? A Reflection on Race, Social Science,
and the Law, 44 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 515, 516 (2010).
22. Id. at 517.
23. Id. at 524.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 522 (citing Michael Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity by the Numbers: The
Warren Court's EmpiricalLegacy, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1309, 1342 (2002)).
26. Fradella, supra note 4, at 107 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
27. Id. (citing David L. Faigman, "Normative ConstitutionalFact-Finding:" Exploring the
EmpiricalComponent of ConstitutionalInterpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 567-68 (1991)).
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Thus, Faigman suggests that the Court employed constitutional factfinding in support of its ultimate holding.28 While doing so, the Court's
"review of social scientific evidence led the Supreme Court to answer the
issue presented in Brown in the affirmative."29
Furthermore, others argue that there was no empirical question raised
in Brown, thus social science data was not necessary in addressing the
question before the Court. 30 Instead they advance the idea that there is no
need for evidence towards the "'proposition that segregation is an insult to
the Black community-we know it; we know it the way we know that a
cold causes snuffles."' 31
Whether or not one agrees with the latter view, the Court chose to
incorporate social science research backing its decision in Brown.
"That
decision has palpable consequences when considering the question of how
federal courts view the role of social science evidence in the adjudication
process." 33 The Court's decision in Brown symbolizes the fact that the
Supreme Court has recognized the importance of incorporating social
science evidence in judicial fact-finding. 34
Moreover, over fifty years have passed since the decision in Brown
and there remains widespread disagreement about whether social science
research has or should play a significant role in the jurisprudence regarding
racial discrimination.35 Today, legal scholars stress that social science
28. Id at 107-08.
29. Id at 108.
30. Id.
31. Id. (citing Ronald Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights
Consequences of Uncertainty, 6 J.L. & EDuc. 3, 5 (1977)).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. Furthermore,

-

The

The research the Supreme Court cited in Brown was one of the primary
reasons the Court found that segregation violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, [as scholars] point out,
[t]he United States Supreme Court has received empirical social science data
on many occasions in the wake of Brown. Prominent examples include
social science's role in decisions concerning school desegregation,
obscenity, segregation by gender, jury size, discriminatory death penalty,
death-qualified juries, juvenile delinquency, discrimination, and Eighth
Amendment death penalty challenges. Although social statistics did not
form the basis for any of these decisions, the Court has increasingly engaged
in consulting the social science literature, acknowledging that "legal theory
is one thing. But the practicalitics are different."
Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science: Selective
Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REv. 111-12 (1993).
35.

Moran, supra note 21, at 516.
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practitioners remain unsure about their own neutrality and objectivity and
face opposition being heard amongst a market of information and ideas
based on questionable quality.36 As a result, social scientists face backlash
for the notion that their expertise is a proper foundation for legal
decisions.37
Brown's influence in the legal community was expansive. Law
professor, Michael Heise, argued that "'one of Brown's critical-though
underappreciated-indirect effects [is that of] transforming educational
opportunity doctrine by casting it empirically."' 38 He further argued that
"the decision contributed to 'law's increasingly multidisciplinary
character,' a change that greatly expands what counts as knowledge in the
courtroom."

39

He suggests that the overarching role of Brown is that it

established a new role for social sciences in law. 0 However, Heise's
approach is only one opinion among many critics and proponents of the
idea that Brown served a catalyst for the application of social sciences in
law .41

The Court's Growing Hostility to the Application of Social
Science Data and McCleskey v. Kemp

I.

In considering subsequent U.S. Supreme Court holdings, it seems that
the critics of social science evidence prevailed, as evidenced by the Court's
growing hostility to the application of social science data to support lower
42
In the seminal case of McCleskey v. Kemp, the Court
court holdings.
considered a capital sentencing case with a defendant who presented social
science data 43 to show that the death penalty was applied unfairly based on
race.44 The Court refused to incorporate social science data into their
decision despite rendering the methodologies valid.45 The Court went
further in noting that evidence of existing disparities in the data was not
considered proof of intentional and particularized discrimination against

36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 523 (citing Michael Heise, Brown v. Board of Education, Footnote 11, and
Multidisciplinarity,90 CORNELL L. REV. 279, 280 (2005)).
39. Moran, supra note 21, at 523.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 524.
42. Id. at 523-24; see generally Fradella,supra note 4.
43. David C. Baldus et al., ComparativeReview of Death Sentences: An EmpiricalStudy of
the GeorgiaExperience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661, 753 (1983).
44. Moran, supra note 21, at 524.
45.

Id. at 523-24.
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McCleskey, which was the standard at the time and remains the standard to
date. This standard is referred to as the "Intent Doctrine."
Looking
forward, the comingling of race and capital sentencing in McCleskey
provides a backdrop for analyzing how social science data should shape our
understanding of the contours of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The Intent Doctrine applied in McCleskey grew out of the Washington
v. Davis and PersonnelAdministrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney era.47 in
Washington v. Davis, the Washington D.C. Police administered "Test 21"
to all job applicants in order to measure "verbal ability, vocabulary, and
reading comprehension." 48 Because black applicants failed the test at a
higher rate than white applicants, the black applicants pointed to the
disparate impact of the test's results as a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 9 Their complaint hinged on the
idea that there was no evidence that Test 21 tested the skills applicable to
being a police officer.50 The Court held that the disparate impact of the
facially neutral civil service test was not enough to give rise to the
application of strict scrutiny analysis. 1 Moreover, for the Court to adopt
strict scrutiny in determining that a law, policy, or practice is in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause, the plaintiffs would have to show
discriminatory intent or purpose. 52 Without such a showing, the Court
applied rational basis review.5 3
In Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, the Court
specified that the standard of purposeful discrimination offends the
Constitution when analyzing the context of gender equality against the
backdrop of veteran preference laws.54 The holding in Feeney exemplified
that in order to prove a Equal Protection Clause violation, the plaintiff must
prove that a state legislature adopted the law "because of, not merely in
spite of, its adverse effects" upon the affected group. 5 The majority

46. Id at 524.
47. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256 (1979).
48. Davis, 426 U.S. at 234-35 (citing the district court's "findings and conclusions" in
Davis v. Washington, 348 F. Supp. 15 (D.D.C 1972)).
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 237, 240.
Id. at 249.
Id. at 268-70.
Id.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 259-60 (1976).
Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979).
Id. at 279 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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opinion's application of purposeful discrimination then carried into
16
McCleskey.
There is still tension over which standard of review the Court should
apply and how social science evidence might play a helpful role in Equal
Protection jurisprudence. This raises an important question about whether
there is an avenue by which the Court may understand and utilize social
science data, allowing the judiciary to integrate social sciences in its
holdings while applying its own doctrinal rules to arrive at fair and
Today, the Court continues to apply the Intent
equitable decisions.
Doctrine established in McCleskey, despite more recent social science
findings suggesting that humans have implicit biases.57 Additionally, in
2015, Scientific Magazine published a study, Estimating the
Reproducibility of Psychological Science, finding that only thirty-six
percent of psychological studies are replicable.58 These findings come with
their own set of criticisms 59 but must still be accounted for in shaping our
understanding of the contours of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment as well as how courts should utilize social science
data given its evolving nature. This paper will discuss the implications that
evolving social science data has on the adjudication of cases involving the
Equal Protection Clause analyzed against the backdrop of McCleskey.
Furthermore, it is important to emphasize the role that this evolving data
has on our understanding of the law given its low rate of reproducibility.
A.

Warren McCleskey's Attempt to Use Social Science Evidence

Warren McCleskey was an African-American male convicted of
killing a white police officer in Georgia.6 0 Unbeknownst to him, his case
would go down in legal and political history as one of the most prominent
challenges to the death penalty, weaving two highly sensitive topics into
one case: race and capital punishment.61 In facing punishment by death,
McCleskey tried to show that the jury deciding whether he should be

56.
57.

See generally McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
See generally Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition:

Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REVIEW 4 (1995).

See discussion of the

Implicit Association Test ("IAT") below.
OPEN SCIENCE COLLABORATION, Estimating the Reproducibility of Psychological
58.
Science, 349 SCIENCE MAG. 943 (2015).

59. Benedict Carey, Many Psychology Findings Not as Strong as Claimed, Study Says,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/201 5/08/28/sciencc/many-social-sciencefindings-not-as-strong-as-claimed-study-says.html? r-0.
60.

FAIGMAN, supra note 2.

61.

Id. at 255, 258.
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sentenced to death was biased against him because of his race.62 However,
according to the Court, the only avenue for McCleskey to succeed would
be to prove that the jury had a discriminatory purpose.63 The Court in
Feeney found that

"discriminatory purpose" . . . implies more than intent as
volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies
that the

decisionmaker . ..

selected

or

reaffirmed

a

particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not
merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group."
Thus, McCleskey had to prove that the jury
intentionally and particularly discriminated against him,
which proved to be a nearly impossible feat.65
Around the time of McCleskey's case, the results of the Baldus Study
were released.6 6 The lead researcher, David Baldus, along with his team
examined roughly 230 variables to find which variable most influenced the
decision to assign the death penalty. 6 7 They concluded that, all other things
being equal, "defendants charged with killing white victims were 4.3 times
as likely to receive a death sentence as defendants charged with killing
blacks."68 Thus, the study indicated that "juries considered crimes against
whites to be more egregious than crimes against blacks and imposed
punishments accordingly."69 Put differently, African Americans were
punished more harshly because of their race. The findings, based on race,
are as follows

70

:

Race of Defendant

Race of Victim

Death Sentencing Rates

Black
White
Black
White

White
White
Black
Black

.21
.08
.01
.03

62.
63.
64.
442 U.S.
65.
66.
67.

(50/233)
(58/748)
(18/1443)
(2/60)

Id. at 259.
Id.
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987) (citing Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney,
256, 279, 299 (1979)).
FAIGMAN, supra note 2, at 259.
Id at 257.
Id

68.

Id. (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 287 (1987)).

69.

DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE LAW

116 (1999).
70.

Baldus et al., supra note 43.
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Several commentators noted that the Baldus Study is highly credible
and was "far and away the most complete and thorough analysis of
sentencing that [had] ever been done."7 1 McCleskey chose to introduce
these findings to show that the death penalty was imposed upon him in a
discriminatory manner.72 The district court scrutinized the methodology
applied in the Baldus Study despite the legal community's response that
criticizing the Baldus Study without proper knowledge of the scientific
methods applied would be improper.7 3 However, the lower court judge
noted that "in any event, the disparities were not proof of intentional
discrimination against any particular defendant." 74 McCleskey's case then
reached the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals,75 followed by the Supreme
Court.7 6 Given the backlash that the district court faced for criticizing the
studies' methodology, the Supreme Court assumed the validity of the
77
Baldus Study, yet chose not to take its findings into consideration despite
the Court's apparent lack of understanding on how the psychological
experiment was conducted.78 McCleskey was then sentenced to death by
lethal injection.79
Although the Court's willingness to ignore the findings of the Baldus
Study led to McCleskey's death, the presence of systematic prejudice in the
Georgia capital sentencing system was exposed.so The Court was going to
uphold McCleskey's conviction either way, but now the public was made
aware of the Court's willingness to ignore the presence of systematic
Today-nearly thirty years later-there are further
discrimination.
developments expanding what is known about the human mind as well as
intentional versus implicit discrimination and biases. Yet, the Court still
applies the same standard of individual and particularized discrimination.
What can and should be done differently?

71. Fradella, supra note 4, at 110-11 (quoting Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp:
Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1399 (1988)).
72. Id at I10.
73. FAIGMAN, supra note 2, at 258; Moran, supra note 21, at 522.
74. Moran, supra note 21, at 524 (citing McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 356-61, 379
(N.D. Ga. 1984).
75. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877 (11th Cir. 1985).
76. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
77.

FAIGMAN, supra note 2, at 258.

78.
79.
80.
81.

FAIGMAN, supra note 69, at 118.

FAIGMAN, supra note 2, at 255.
FAIGMAN, supra note 69, at 118.
Id.
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Issues with the Court's Holding in McCleskey

The Intent Doctrine required that McCleskey, who alleged an equal
protection violation, establish that purposeful, particularized discrimination
"had a discriminatory effect" on the outcome of his case. 82 However,
statistics make this a nearly impossible requirement to meet.83 For
example, the Baldus Study stood for the proposition that juries in Georgia
accounted for the race of the victim when making determinations of
whether to impose the death penalty.8 But, a study like this casts a glaring
light on the population in its entirety and does very little to bolster
arguments for particularized discrimination.
Constitutional law scholar,
David Faigman, addresses this issue in his book, Laboratory of Justice,
which discusses decision-makers involved in capital cases: "the prosecutor
who decides whether to seek the death penalty, the jury who decides
whether to impose it, and the judge who presides over the trial and who
enters judgment when it is over-are not likely to admit that they
discriminated."
Furthermore, because jury deliberations are not open to
public scrutiny, the discriminatory backdrop remains and repeats within the
confines of courts, prosecutors, and participating jury members as a
continuous cycle. 87
However, it is important to note: discriminatory actions that occur
may be, for the most part, unconscious.88 For example, the results of the
Baldus Study signify that juries in Georgia place more value on white lives
than black lives, which further points to the idea that their discriminatory
actions are implicit rather than intentional. 89 Despite these results, Justice
Powell concluded "that given the importance of upholding states' criminal
laws against murder and the inevitable discretion inherent in carrying out
these laws, more than a naked statistical showing was necessary to
establish an equal protection violation." 90
Furthermore, Faigman contends that "those who argue [that] the
Supreme Court's use of empirical data was disingenuous failed to
understand the process of legal reasoning as applied in the constitutional

82.
83.

FAIGMAN, supra note 2, at 259.
Id.

84.
85.
86.
87.

Id
Id.
Id.
Id.

88.

FAIGMAN, supra note 2, at 259; see Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 57.

89.

FAIGMAN, supra note 2, at 259.

90.

Id.
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adjudication process." 91 Faigman's argument is furthered by his suggestion
that the essential role of social science research forces the Court to take on
and tackle the more difficult normative issues it faces. 92 In addressing
McCleskey, Faigman states that
the struggle to come to terms with the implications of
racial bias in capital sentencing may have been buried in
factual suppositions if not for the data. Furthermore, [t]he
costs associated with transforming a whole body of law to
accommodate inconvenient facts create an obstacle to
By preventing the Court from
unbridled discretion.
inventing convenient facts, empirical research compels the
Court to face up to the ramifications of its constitutional
law-making.

93

II. Trustworthy Evidence: The Court's Understanding of How
to Apply Social Science Evidence
Judges are often not equipped to understand the data applied in social
science studies. Justice Powell, the majority writer in McCleskey, later
admitted that "[his] understanding of statistical analysis ... ranges from
limited to zero." 94 As previously mentioned, the majority opinion in
McCleskey disregarded the findings of the Baldus Study, but there may
have been a variety of factors that played into this decision. 95 The Court's
lack of understanding about how to interpret and apply social science
evidence may have resulted in fear that subsequent analysis would expose
an improper application or understanding of the Baldus Study's findings
and the empirical data on which the study was based. 9 6 In fact, this is the
97
same scrutiny the district court had faced in McCleskey.

91.
92.
93.

Fradella, supra note 4, at 113.
Id at 114.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

94.

FAIGMAN, supra note 69, at 118.

95.

JOHN MONAHAN

& LAURENS WALKER,

SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND

MATERIALS 333 (7th ed. 2009); see generally David C. Baldus et al., Law and Statistics in
Conflict: Reflections on McCleskey v. Kemp, IN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW (D.K.

Kagehiro & W.S. Laufer eds., 1992).
96.

MONAHAN & WALKER, supranote 95.

97.

FAIGMAN, supranote 2, at 258.
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This is the crux of the argument for "ensuring that only trustworthy
evidence is presented to the jurors." 98 Evidence scholar, Roger Park,
explains that
[a]t trial, witnesses of events are supposed to relay their
first-hand observations to the jurors, who interpret those
observations, reach conclusions about what happened, and
then come to a decision.. . . One of the hallmarks of the
trial system, inherited from the English common law, was
a fastidious concern for independent findings of fact based
on objective observations."
The jury would extract their conclusions on the matters at hand based
on the observations of the witnesses under oath.10c Thus, it is only through
the application of trustworthy sciences that the system may be maintained
in a way that provides constituents with a just experience.
A.

McCleskey's Reality Maintains the Status Quo

Finding in favor of McCleskey would have gravely disrupted courts'
application of death sentences in the jurisdictions that allowed criminal
0
defendants to face death.o'
Furthermore, when the Court decided
McCleskey,
more than 3,000 death sentences had been imposed, but
fewer than 100 had been actually carried out through the
execution. A finding in favor of McCleskey, whether
based upon the jury discrimination model or an
employment discrimination model, which would have led
to the scrutiny of each individual death sentence, would
likely have led to the wholesale staying of executions until
each jurisdiction's death-sentencing could be legitimated
through an empirical study.
A delay of 5 years in
executions as a consequence would not have seemed
unlikely. The outcry against the Court from such a policy
would have been predictable.' 02

98.
99.
100.

ROGER PARK ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW
Id
Id

§

101.

MONAHAN & WALKER, supra note 95.

102.

Id

14.01, at 530 (2d ed. 2004).
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At the conclusion of the majority opinion, the Court suggests that a
better forum for McCleskey's arguments would likely be the legislature
because of its flexibility to analyze research in ways that the courts cannot,
given its access to more resources.103
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in McCleskey suggests a
different approach that led him to conclude that "both statistical principles
and human experience, reveal[] that the risk that race influenced
McCleskey's sentence is intolerable by any imaginable standard."'0
Justice Brennan then delves even deeper into the methodology of the
Baldus Study to arrive at its aforementioned conclusion that, after the
Baldus Study accounted for about 230 nonracial variables that could
reasonably be thought to impact a sentence, the study found that
05
McCleskey's life would have avoided death had his victim been black.
The study distinguishes between two situations: the first situation is where
the jury essentially plays no role because the aggravating factors present in
the case point to only one outcome, and the second situation is where there
are only "intermediate" aggravating factors where the jury is given far
more discretion and responsibility.' 06 McCleskey's circumstances put his
case into the scheme of the second situation, and
[i]n such cases, death is imposed in 34% of white-victim
crimes and 14% of black-victim crimes, a difference of
139% in the rate of imposition of the death penalty. In
other words, just under 59%-almost 6 in 10-[of the]
defendants comparable to McCleskey would not have
received the death penalty if their victims had been

black.'0 7
III. Changing Views: The Tension Between the Intent Doctrine
and Implicit Bias
Nearly thirty years have passed since the Supreme Court's holding in
McCleskey, and the Intent Doctrine remains the Court's standard for cases
alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' 08 However, since 1987, there have been social science
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987).
Id. at 325 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id

108.

Intent

Standard,

EQUAL

JUSTICE

intentdoctrine/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2017).

SOCIETY,

http://equaljusticesociety.org/law/

446

[Vol. 44:4

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

developments that undercut the idea that the Court relies on in its Intent
Doctrine. The newer findings suggest that humans indeed carry implicit
biases.'0
The Implicit Association Test ("IAT") published in
Psychological Review in 1995110 is the standard by which implicit
cognition is determined. The IAT defined implicit cognition as "traces of
past experience [that] affect some performance, even though the influential
earlier experience is not remembered in the usual sense-that is, it is
unavailable to self-report or introspection.""' Anthony Greenwald and
Mahzarin Banaji explain implicit cognition as a means of revealing
associative information that people were not otherwise aware of or able to
report,112 regardless of their own motivation to access it. 113

They even

compared implicit cognition to being "simply unreachable in the same way
that memories are sometimes unreachable, not just in amnesic patients, but
in every person."ll4
They concluded that a large portion of "social
cognition occurs in an implicit mode."' 15 Although the IAT has its own
limitations and its reliability has been criticized, 1 6 it still questions the
simplistic understanding of intentional discrimination and suggests that
discriminatory interactions between people are complicated and cannot be
analyzed solely through the lens of intentional discrimination.

IV. Reproducibility of Psychological Science
The long-running tension in the relationship between the law and
social science evidence is further complicated by more recent findings that
only thirty-six percent of replications done on psychological studies have
significant results." 7 In August 2015, Estimating the Reproducibility of
Psychological Science (the "Reproduction Study") was published, which
reproduced one hundred experimental studies that had been published
across three reputable psychology journals. 18 They aimed to reproduce the

109.
110.
111.

Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 57.
Id
Id. at 4-5.
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Id.
Id.
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studies using original materials when available." 9 The study found that the
120
results of psychological studies would rarely produce the same result.
Thus, the study bolsters yet another reason why the Supreme Court would
likely refute the application of social science evidence in their opinions.
However, there is more than one factor to be considered when
analyzing the success of the reproduced study.121 In this particular study,
p-value and effect size were used as two mechanisms in developing the
findings.1 22 The p-value estimates the probability that the result was
arrived at by chance alone and/or is a false positive; if the statistical test
finds that the p-value is lower than five percent, then the results of the
study are considered to be due to the effects of the study as opposed to a
false positive and thus are deemed significant.1 23 Effect size measures how
big the effect is as opposed to measuring the reliability.124 Reproducibility
is generally more likely when the original study has a lower p-value and a
larger effect size.125 The Reproduction Study ultimately found that thirtyHowever, it is
six percent of replications had significant results.126
important to note that this data should not be accepted as gospel because it
also has been criticized.
When aiming to reproduce the findings, it is unclear whether the
environmental conditions were replicated properly and what substitutes
were used when original materials were not available.' 27 Additionally, it is
not completely clear how the aforementioned factors played into the thirtysix percent finding.1 28 Thus, although these considerations suggest that the
findings are eye-opening, perhaps the limitations are not as harsh as
suggested. Additionally, the study itself states in its conclusion that
reproducibility, as a concept, is not well understood because the incentive
that drives scientists is more heavily weighed toward novelty over
replication.129

However, it also states that in order for psychological
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studies to move forward there must be reliance on replication and
novelty. 130

Critics of the Reproduction Study suggest that the findings are
inconclusive.13' The critics pointed to a few weaknesses in the findings
that suggest a more skeptical approach; for example, the replicated findings
themselves were never replicated, which would have accounted for any
errors in the applied methodologies.1 32 However, the study refuted this
notion by claiming that the researchers tasked with conducting the
replications were to work closely with the original researchers and to
involve more participants, which statistically strengthened the findings.' 3 3
Additionally, issues stemming from the Reproduction Study are farther
reaching than just the social sciences. PLoS Medicine published an article,
Why Most PublishedResearch FindingsAre False, addressing this issue in
relation to "hard" sciences as well, which includes biomedical research.1 34
Here, the article highlighted the "increasing concern that most current
published research findings are false."1 3 5 The article also stated that
[t]he probability that a research claim is true may depend
on study power and bias, the number of other studies on
the same question, and, importantly, the ratio of true to no
relationships among the relationships probed in each
scientific field. In this framework, a research finding is
less likely to be true when the studies conducted in a field
are smaller; when there is a greater number and lesser
preselection of tested relationships; where there is greater
flexibility in designs, definitions, outcomes, and analytical
modes; when there is greater financial and other interest
and prejudice; and when more teams are involved in a
scientific field in chase of statistical significance.
Simulations show that for most study designs and settings,
it is more likely for a research claim to be false than true.
Moreover, for many current scientific fields, claimed

130. Id.
131. Carey, supra note 59.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See John P.A. loannidis, Why Most Published Research Findings are False, 2 PLOS
MED. 696, 696-701 (2005).
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research findings may often be simply accurate measures
of the prevailing bias. 13 6

V. Remedies the Court Should Consider
Given the information we can glean from the outcome of McCleskey,
we know that the Court must consider a various methods to ensure that
social science data is applied appropriately where there is any doubt as to
the outcome of the case. McCleskey is a good reminder that the Court may
even reject the application of valid social science as irrelevant research
when deeply rooted constitutional values are the point of contention. 137
While the role of race discrimination in the death sentencing system is one
of importance, the broader question is how the Court should utilize
behavioral science data in determining what standard of review to apply,
especially given the recent developments in the reproducibility of social
science data and implicit bias. While there are no perfect answers, there
are a few possible ways the Court can move forward.
The Court's apprehension towards incorporating social science
evidence into its holdings can be remedied through ensuring that the
evidence has been vetted properly to ensure validity and reproducibility of
the study. One recent development is JuriLytics, which conducts peer
reviews of expert testimony and reports.138 JuriLytics is also a way that
courts, or either party, can eliminate the "battle of the experts" and conduct
a neutral analysis.1 39 JuriLytics is an assessment of the existing papers, not
a replication of the underlying methodologies in each individual study.
Thus, the scope is relatively limited.
If the idea presented by JuriLytics were to go one step further and
closely replicate studies rather than simply provide an analysis of the
existing findings and methodologies, then perhaps this would provide a
stronger incentive for the Court to consider accounting for the data. This
solution would only bolster validity. It would not address how the Court
should adopt newer findings in changings its application, like in the case of
the Intent Doctrine and the new data suggesting that implicit biases exist.
The IAT itself suggested "strategies for avoiding unintended
discrimination" to address concerns related to social discrimination in a
variety of public settings, which it divided into three categories: blinding,
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consciousness raising, and affirmative action. 140 Blinding is the process of
denying the decision maker exposure to the possibly biasing information.141
Contrary to the proposition put forth in blinding, consciousness raising
"encourages the decision maker to have heightened awareness of potential
cues that could elicit discrimination." 1 42 The third avenue suggested in the
IAT is affirmative action, which is distinct compared to the aforementioned
categories because affirmative action by its very nature has a "deliberate
compensatory component." 43 Affirmative action is compensatory because
it accounts for a characteristic, which is known to be at the root of negative
discrimination, and considers that characteristic advantageous."'4 Although
these three suggestions presented by the TAT all serve advantages in
varying capacities, their application in the TAT does not reflect other
research done on these three avenues-the focus and benefit is on
situations where discriminatory behavior is rooted in implicit attitudes. 145
The intent standard can be adapted to reflect some of these strategies
to avoid unintentional discrimination in juries in capital sentencing cases,
such as McCleskey. Blinding would likely not be a viable solution because
it is unlikely that the prosecution would be able to color its argument or put
on eyewitness testimony if any mention of race were to be eliminated from
the trial.1 46 However, consciousness raising could be a viable option in
which juries can be made aware of implicit biases in the context of jury
instructions in capital cases.147 According to the TAT's analysis on
consciousness raising, the act of bringing the presence of implicit bias to
the jury's attention will afford the jury the opportunity to account for and
hopefully avoid the possible bias.1 4 8 Although consciousness raising may
not completely eliminate every trace of implicit bias, the reduction of
implicit bias from the jury's decision is a step in the right direction.
Additionally, this solution does not place unreasonable costs upon courts or
litigants. The opposing argument to the application of consciousness
raising in jury instructions is that drawing attention to implicit bias based
on race could draw the jury's attention to a variable that they were not
140.
141.

Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 57, at 19.
Id.
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implicitly biased about and, therefore, swaying their decision because the
jury would hope not to appear discriminatory.
The third suggested option is affirmative action, otherwise referred to
as reverse discrimination because of its proposition to discriminate in favor
of the category of people generally discriminated against.1 49 However, it is
unlikely that this would bode well for the Court if it were adapting its
current Intent Doctrine to account for implicit biases. Further, the category
of people generally not discriminated against would likely have a claim that
they face discrimination in their sentencing by juries, which would serve as
counterproductive. Proponents for the application of affirmative action
would likely claim that the findings of the Baldus Study would serve as
"compensation for past, present, and likely future implicit discrimination by
persons who have no intent to discriminate ... . [and thus] affirmative
action strategies might be understood as strategies for reversal of
discrimination,"150 which would likely result in more balanced results of
the Baldus Study. However, the Court has a history with addressing issues
hinging on affirmative action claims in the context of affirmative action in
schools. In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1, the Court held that giving an advantage to a minority student
for the purposes of bolstering racial integration was not permissible but that
race-conscious objectives shown to be narrowlytailored would pass
muster. 151 This analysis, against the backdrop of McCleskey, would likely
point to consciousness raising as a more viable option.
Another alternative is taking away the jury's role in determining
whether the death sentence is appropriate and allocating this responsibility
to judges alone. However, critics have suggested that in jurisdictions
where justices are elected, those judges reverse capital convictions half of
the time compared to appointed judges.1 52 This suggests that the political
pressure of being reelected may bias a judge against making fair and
These findings thwart
equitable decisions during the appeals process.
the notion that courts bear the responsibility of protecting and promoting
the constitutional rights of litigants without political pressure looming over
them.15 On the other hand, facing reelection helps ensure that judges are
149.
150.
151.
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making fair and equitable decisions in their application of the law despite
their own biases compared to justices who are appointed and seemingly
have greater leeway to adjudicate in an activist-type role."' In 2013,
Justice Sotomayor cited a study finding that judges in Alabama imposed
the death penalty upon defendants at a higher rate during election years.156
The arguments posed on both sides suggest the notion that decisions by
juries may provide defendants in capital cases with more perspective and
input than the risk that a judge may be carrying his or her own implicit or
deliberate biases.
Conclusion
Considering the adversarial nature of the court system along with the
scientific methodologies applied in social science experiments, balance is
achieved when the courts find a way to account for the evolving nature of
social science. This idea gives rise to a series of questions for the Court to
consider moving forward: Now that we are aware that implicit biases exist,
why does the Court still continue to uphold the particularized Intent
Doctrine that was applied in McCleskey? Would it be likely that a case-bycase analysis would reach a fairer outcome? What is the cost-benefit
outcome if the Court were to have access to resources to replicate studies?
Although the Court still continues to use the Intent Doctrine, newer
findings suggest that implicit biases within the human mind may also factor
into discriminatory effect and should be taken into consideration without
opening up the floodgates and disrupting the courts. Additionally, the
Reproduction Study-which found that only roughly one-third of
psychological science is reproducible-is relevant in suggesting that courts
should consider reproducing studies to check validity and reliability before
altering precedent. Although there is no perfect solution for the Court to
adopt, the current application of the outdated Intent Doctrine does not
provide a fair and equitable court system. We will achieve a fair and
equitable court system after we learn that we may not assume that judges
are all-knowing when interpreting social science data and that using other
avenues, such as those suggested in the IAT for how to avoid unintended
discrimination, may serve as a springboard for understanding that implicit
biases do exist. In order to be on the cutting edge of all of these
considerations, courts must look to the reproducibility of social science
findings in conjunction with applying newer developments, such as
JuriLytics. The hope is that courts will take the aforementioned factors into
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consideration in moving forward and create viable solutions for all those
who utilize the services of the court when adjudicating cases.
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